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THE NEW WARRANT REQUIREMENTS: Payton v. New York AND
Wallace v. King
I. INTRODUCTION
Since the original Bill of Rights was drafted, the diverse warrant re-
quirements necessary for reasonable searches and seizures under the
fourth amendment' have led to chaos and confusion. A dichotomy has
existed between the requirements necessary for the search and seizure of
property and those necessary for the search and seizure of persons.2 Gen-
erally, a warrant has been required when the object of the search and
seizure was property3 while no warrant has been necessary for the seizure
of an individual.4 The Supreme Court decision in Payton v. New York5
has erased much of this distinction, holding that the fourth amendment
prohibits a warrantless entry into a suspect's home for a routine felony
arrest. However, the decision left unanswered the question of whether the
police have the authority, without obtaining either an arrest or a search
warrant, to enter the home of a third party in order to arrest a suspect.6
1. U.S. CONST. amend. IV:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects,
against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no warrants
shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation, and particu-
larly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.
2. See, e.g., Trupiano v. United States, 334 U.S. 699 (1948). This case involved an entry
onto property for the dual purpose of searching and seizing both a person and property.
Although there was ample time to obtain warrants, the entry and subsequent searches and
seizures were performed without benefit of either a search or arrest warrant. The court de-
nied the legality of the seizure of property while upholding the arrest, even though the rea-
sons for denial were equally applicable to the arrest.
3. See, e.g., Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 357 (1967). Exceptions to the general
rule include but are not limited to: emergency, Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385 (1978);
automobiles, Cardwell v. Lewis, 417 U.S. 583 (1974); Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42
(1970); consent, Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218 (1973); plain view, Coolidge v.
New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443 (1971); search incident to arrest, Chimel v. California, 395
U.S. 752 (1969); stop and frisk, Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968); hot pursuit, Warden v.
Hayden, 387 U.S. 294 (1967).
4. See Rotenburg and Tanzer, Searching for the Person to be Seized, 35 OHIO ST. L.J. 56
(1974); Wilgus, Arrest Without a Warrant, 22 MICH. L. REV. 541 (1924). This "anomoly," as
it is called in United States v. Watson, 423 U.S. 411, 427 (1976) (Powell, J., concurring), is
an understandable by-product of a time when property rights were valued more highly than
personal rights. See LASSoN, THE HISTORY AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE FouRTH AMENDMENT To
THE UNITED STATES CONsTITuTION 13-50 (1935).
5. 445 U.S. 573 (1980).
6. Id. at 583.
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The Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals has answered that question in Wal-
lace v. King,7 holding that the police may not search a third party dwell-
ing to effectuate an arrest without a search warrant, even though they
have a valid arrest warrant. This comment will trace briefly the history of
entries for searches and arrests and then analyze the Payton decision and
the Fourth Circuit's extension of that decision in Wallace.
II. DISCUSSION
A. The History of Search and Seizure
While English common law often proves helpful in understanding cur-
rent legal problems, such is not the case with the issue of warrantless
arrests in a home. Disagreement among common-law commentators" is
based on two divergent maxims concerning the sanctity of the home: "a
man's home is his castle" and "the king's keys unlock all doors." 10 Be-
cause of this difference of opinion, nothing of real substance emerges
from the common law to aid in the discovery of what was in the framers'
minds when they drafted the fourth amendment.
It is recognized, however, that "for four hundred years Crown and Par-
liament assumed and abused the power to authorize broad ranging
searches and . . [that] opposition to such practices culminated in the
judicial decisions that inspired libertarian thought on this side of the At-
lantic."" It was the general writ, giving broad search powers, that the
fourth amendment was designed to prohibit. These writs were mainly
used by customs officers to enforce trade laws.1 2 It remains a subject of
great controversy, however, as to whether our founding fathers intended
7. 626 F.2d 1157 (4th Cir. 1980).
8. For discussions of the conflicting views, see Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. at 583-85;
Miller v. United States, 357 U.S. 301, 307-08 (1953); Accarino v. United States, 179 F.2d
456, 464 (D.C. Cir. 1949); 78 COLUM. L. REv. 1550, 1551-53 (1978); 82 DICK. L. REV. 167, 168
n.5 (1977).
9. CoKE, THIRD INSTITUTE 162 (1644), cited in United States v. Reed, 572 F.2d 412, 422
(2d Cir. 1978). While this maxim was primarily applicable to civil actions, its impact has
also been felt in the area of criminal law.
10. Wilgus, supra note 4, at 800.
11. Yackle, The Burger Court and the Fourth Amendment, 26 KAN. L. REV. 335, 338
(1978).
12. The Supreme Court, in Stanford v. Texas, 379 U.S. 476 (1965), recognized that
[v]ivid in the memory of the newly independent Americans were those general war-
rants known as writs of assistance under which officers of the Crown had so bedeviled
the colonists. The hated writs of assistance had given customs officials blanket au-
thority to search where they pleased for goods imported in violation of British tax
laws.
Id. at 481.
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to extend the scope of the fourth amendment beyond the realm of the
general writ.
The very language of the fourth amendment has contributed signifi-
cantly to the controversy. As originally proposed, the amendment con-
tained a single clause which imposed limitations on the issuance of war-
rants but not on warrantless searches and seizures. 13 The language of our
present amendment was rejected on the floor of the first Congress. How-
ever, the final draft, from the committee whose purported task it was to
make grammatical but not substantive changes, contained the rejected
language. It was in this form that the amendment completed the ratifica-
tion process. 14 In the present form there are two separate clauses, a war-
rant clause and a reasonableness clause. The relative importance of each
is disputed. Some have inferred that the additional prohibition against
unreasonable searches was intended to be more than a mere description
of the form of the warrant.15
Despite these ambiguities, the language of our present fourth amend-
ment applies equally to seizures of property and seizures of persons.16
Throughout its history, though, an ever-widening gap has developed be-
tween what is required in order to search and seize property and the re-
quirements for a search for and arrest of an individual. 7 By the time
13. The original language read:
The rights of the people to be secured in their persons, their houses, their papers, and
their other property, from all unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be vio-
lated by warrants issued without probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation, or
not particularly describing the places to be searched, or the persons or things to be
seized.
LAssoN, supra note 4, at 100 (quoting ANNALS OF CONG. 452 (1st Cong., 1st Sess.)).
14. Yackle, supra note 11, at 344.
15. Fraenkel, Concerning Searches and Seizures, 34 HARv. L. REV. 361, 366 (1921).
16. See note I supra.
17. There was not a great deal of fourth amendment case law decided by the early Su-
preme Court. Ex parte Buford, 7 U.S. (3 Cranch) 447 (1806) held that arrest warrants were
similar to search warrants in that they had to be supported by probable cause. Subse-
quently, cases interpreted requirements for search warrants, but the court was curiously
silent on arrest warrants. In Ex parte Jackson, 96 U.S. 727 (1877) the Court said, in dicta,
that sealed letters and packages in the mail were personal papers and were to be given the
same protection as if they were in the home, i.e. they could only be opened with a warrant.
Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616 (1886) extended fourth amendment protection to a
subpoena duces tecum.
With the inception of the exclusionary rule in Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914)
and the ratification of the eighteenth amendment (prohibition), the Court was flooded with
fourth amendment cases. Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438 (1928) (conviction of
conspiracy to import liquor upheld) provided a good definition of search and seizure appli-
cable at that time. The Court held that since wiretaps involved no physical trespass and no
1981] 409
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Payton reached the Supreme Court, the two sets of requirements bore no
resemblance to each other, as if emanating from separate sources. Con-
cerning the search for property, Katz v. United States", held that war-
rantless searches were per se unreasonable. Concerning arrests, however,
United States v. Watson 9 held that most warrantless arrests in public
seizure of tangible items, the protection of the fourth amendment was therefore not
triggered.
Even when the activity was classified as search and seizure under the fourth amendment,
the Court began carving out exceptions to the warrant requirement. In the early automobile
cases, Hsty v. United States, 282 U.S. 694 (1931) and Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132
(1925), the Court established the rule that exigency might excuse the lack of a warrant. In
the alcoholic beverage cases, the Court began to expand the permissibly-searched area be-
yond the suspect's immediate person and into the surrounding area. See United States v.
Lefkowitz, 285 U.S. 452 (1932); Go-Bart Importing Co. v. United States, 282 U.S. 344
(1931); Marron v. United States, 275 U.S. 192 (1927); Agnello v. United States, 269 U.S. 20
(1925).
While Weeks established the exclusionary rule for federal prosecutions, the fourth amend-
ment itself did not become applicable to the states until Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25
(1949). However, right and remedy were split as the Court refused to hold Colorado to the
exclusionary rule, saying that other methods were available. 338 U.S. at 30. For a compre-
hensive study on the difficulties arising from this decision, see Kamisar, Wolf and Lustig
Ten Years Later, 43 MINN. L. REv. 1083 (1959). The Court in Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643
(1961) recognized the exclusionary rule as the only effective means available to enforce the
fourth amendment and, therefore, approved its applicability to state prosecutions.
As the foregoing synopsis shows, extensive delineation occurred with respect to searches
for property. On the other hand, almost no guidance was forthcoming concerning arrests.
Since the language of the fourth amendment applies equally to searches and seizures of
individuals, it is reasonable to expect that the property cases would apply by analogy to
arrests. Such has not been the case. The Supreme Court noted, in Gerstein v. Pugh, 420
U.S. 103, 113 (1975) that it had "never invalidated an arrest supported by probable cause
solely because the officers failed to secure a warrant," even though the use of a warrant was
preferable. That statement held true until Payton.
18. 389 U.S. 347 (1967). The Katz Court overruled Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S.
438 (1928) and rejected the notion that physical trespass was a prerequisite to a search. Also
cast away was the notion that only tangible items were subject to seizure. The Court held
that a defendant's justifiable expectation of privacy was violated so that a search and
seizure covered by the fourth amendment occurred when his conversation from a tapped
phone booth was intercepted and recorded by government officials.
19. 423 U.S. 411 (1976). Upon probable cause to believe Watson was in possession of sto-
len credit cards, a postal inspector arrested him in a restaurant. Watson was then removed
to the street and given Miranda warnings. Even though Watson had no cards on his person,
the Inspector asked if he could search Watson's car, reminding him that anything found
there could be used against him. Watson replied, "Go ahead!" and gave the inspector the
keys. In the subsequent search two cards were found and later determined to be stolen. The
Court held Watson's arrest was not invalid because it was warrantless and justified its deci-
sion on three grounds: 1) common law authority allowed arrests in public without a warrant;
2) the consensus of the states clearly allowed warrantless arrests; 3) there was a federal
statute authorizing the postal inspector to make such arrests.
[Vol. 15:407410
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were reasonable.
Lower courts began to fill the void with decisions of their own. Some
held that an arrest warrant was necessary for an arrest made in the
home.20 Others found if there was probable cause to arrest the Constitu-
tion did not require a warrant.2 1 Still others merely assumed that a war-
rantless arrest in the home was unconstitutional.22 One case upheld such
an arrest without discussing the constitutional issue.2 3 Since the Supreme
Court denied certiorari in two of these cases,24 it is conceivable that the
Justices were waiting for the right factual situation in order to decide the
issue. The opportunity apparently presented itself when the New York
Court of Appeals, in a single decision, affirmed the convictions of Theo-
dore Payton and Obie Riddick.2 5
B. Payton v. New York
The facts of the Payton arrest are as follows: on January 15, 1970 at
7:30 a.m., six New York police officers went to Payton's apartment to ar-
rest him. They had not obtained a warrant for his arrest but perceived,
after an intensive investigation, that they had probable cause to believe
Payton had murdered a gas station manager a few days earlier .2 The of-
ficers knocked on the door but drew no response even though there was
light and music coming from the apartment. With the use of crowbars,
the police entered the dwelling and found no one present. However, they
did find, among other things,2 7 a 30-caliber shell casing in plain view.
20. See, e.g., United States v. Houle, 603 F.2d 1297 (8th Cir. 1979); United States v. Pres-
cott, 581 F.2d 1343 (9th Cir. 1978) (absent exigent circumstances); United States v. Reed,
572 F.2d 412 (2d Cir.), cert. denied 439 U.S. 913 (1978); United States v. Killebrew, 560
F.2d 729 (6th Cir. 1977); and Dorman v. United States, 435 F.2d 385 (D.C. Cir. 1970).
21. See, e.g., United States v. Williams, 573 F.2d 348 (5th Cir. 1978); Wright v. Woods,
432 F.2d 1143 (7th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 966 (1971). o
22. See, e.g., United States v. Davis, 461 F.2d 1026 (3d Cir. 1972); United States v. Brad-
ley, 455 F.2d 1181 (1st Cir. 1972); Vance v. North Carolina, 432 F.2d 984 (4th Cir. 1970).
23. Michael v. United States, 393 F.2d 22 (10th Cir. 1968).
24. United States v. Reed, 572 F.2d 412 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 913 (1978);
Wright v. Woods, 432 F.2d 1143 (7th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 966 (1971).
25. People v. Payton, 45 N.Y.2d 300, 380 N.E.2d 224, 408 N.Y.S.2d 395 (1978). The Ap-
pellate Division had previously upheld the convictions in People v. Payton, 55 A.D.2d 859,
390 N.Y.S.2d 769 (1976) (murder) and People v. Riddick, 56 A.D.2d 937, 392 N.Y.S.2d 848
(1977) (narcotics charges).
26. Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. at 576.
27. A thorough search of the apartment divulged numerous objects which were seized as
additional evidence of Payton's guilt. But the prosecutor stipulated that these were illegally
seized since they were found outside the scope of the search for the defendant, i.e. bureau
drawers were searched. Id. at 577 n.5.
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This was seized and later admitted into evidence at Payton's murder
trial. A motion to suppress the evidence was denied. The trial judge held
that the warrantless entry to arrest was authorized by statute s and the
plain view evidence was properly seized.29
The situation surrounding the Riddick arrest is as follows: Riddick was
suspected of having perpetrated two armed robberies in 1971. He was
identified by the victims in June of 1973, but police did not learn of his
address until January, 1974. No warrant for his arrest was obtained. On
March 14, 1974, three police officers and a detective knocked on Riddick's
door. His three-year-old son opened the door and revealed Riddick in the
house on a bed. The officers rushed in and placed him under arrest.
Before allowing him to dress, the police searched a chest of drawers for
weapons and found narcotics and related paraphernalia."0 On trial on the
subsequent narcotics charges, Riddick moved to suppress the evidence.
The trial judge held that the warrantless entry was authorized by the re-
vised New York statutes" and that the search of the immediate area was
28. At the time in question, January 15th, 1970, the law applicable to the police conduct
related above was governed by the Code of Criminal Procedure. Section 177 of the
Code ... recited: "A peace officer may, without a warrant, arrest a person ... 3.
When a felony has in fact been committed, and he has reasonable cause for believing
the person to be arrested to have committed it.' Section 178 of the Code ... pro-
vided: 'To make an arrest, as provided for in the last section (177), the officer may
break open an outer or inner door or window of a building, if, after notice of his office
and purpose, he be refused admittance."
People v. Payton, 84 Misc. 2d 973, 974-75, 376 N.Y.S.2d 779, 780 (1974).
29. The trial judge decided that the suspect was reasonably believed to be armed and
dangerous to the community; there was a clear showing of probable cause that the suspect
had committed the offense, that he was on the premises being entered, and that he would
likely escape if not swiftly apprehended. For those reasons, the judge held that exigent cir-
cumstances excused the lack of compliance with the notice provision of the New York Code.
84 Misc. 2d at 975, 376 N.Y.S.2d at 780. See note 34 infra. Arguably, this same set of facts
could justify a warrantless intrusion. But the New York court did not rely on any such
justification. The cout of appeals majority treated both arrests as routine arrests where
there was ample time to obtain a warrant. 45 N.Y.2d 300, 308, 380 N.E.2d 224, 228, 408
N.Y.S.2d 395, 398 (1978).
30. Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. at 578.
31. N.Y. CrIM. PROc. LAw § 140.15(4) (McKinney 1971) provides:
In order to effect . . . an arrest [without a warrant], a police officer may enter
premises in which he reasonably believes such person to be present, under the same
circumstances and in the same manner as would be authorized... if he were at-
tempting to make such arrest pursuant to a warrant of arrest.
Section 120.80 of the code, covering execution of arrest warrants, provides in part-
4. In order to effect the arrest, the police officer may, under circumstances and in a
manner prescribed in this subdivision, enter any premises in which he reasonably
believes the defendant to be present. Before such entry, he must give, or make rea-
sonable effort to give, notice of his authority and purpose to an occupant thereof,
[Vol. 15:407
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reasonable.3 2
The New York Court of Appeals affirmed both Payton's and Riddick's
convictions, relying for the most part on the
substantial difference between the intrusion which attends an entry for the
purpose of searching the premises and that which results from an entry for
the purpose of making an arrest, and on the significant difference in the
governmental interest in achieving the objective of the intrusion in the two
instances. 3'
While the court recognized that the particular question presented in the
instant case was not addressed by the Supreme Court in United States v.
Watson,3" the majority nevertheless felt that the decision by the Supreme
Court in Watson necessitated the finding that a warrant was not a pre-
requisite for an in-home arrest.3 5 In support of this, the court of appeals
noted the "apparent historical acceptance" of warrantless intrusions to
effect felony arrests at English common law" ' and the use of the practice
in many of the states to this day.37 Three members of the court
dissented.38
unless there is reasonable cause to believe that giving of such notice wilh
(a) Result in the defendant escaping or attempting to escape; or
(b) Endanger the life or safety of the officer or another person; or
(c) Result in the destruction, damaging or secretion of material evidence.
5. If the officer is authorized to enter premises without giving notice of his author-
ity and purpose, or if after giving such notice he is not admitted, he may enter such
premises, and by a breaking if necessary.
32. 445 U.S. at 579 (citing Brief for Appellee at 63-66).
33. People v. Payton, 45 N.Y.2d at 310, 380 N.E.2d at 228-29, 408 N.Y.S.2d at 399. The
majority felt that a search, unless limited by a warrant, was more intrusive on the privacy of
the householder than that involved with an entry to arrest: a search includes rummaging
through personal belongings; an entry to arrest is not accompanied by this "prying into the
area of expected privacy attending his possessions and affairs." Id. at 310, 380 N.E.2d at
229, 408 N.Y.S.2d at 400.
34. 423 U.S. 411 (1976).
35. The court of appeals explained:
That personal seizure alone does not require a warrant was established by United
States v. Watson... which upheld a warrantless arrest made in a public place. In
view of the minimal intrusion on the elements of privacy of the hope [sic] which
results from entry on the premises for making an arrest (as compared with the gross
intrusion which attends the arrest itself), we perceive no sufficient reason for distin-
guishing between an arrest in a public place and an arrest in a residence.
45 N.Y.2d at 310, 380 N.E.2d at 229, 408 N.Y.S.2d at 400.
36. Id.
37. Id. at 311-12, 380 N.E.2d at 229-30, 408 N.Y.S.2d at 400-01.
38. The dissenting justices expressed the view that the Constitution required a warrant
unless there were exigent circumstances. They also disagreed with the majority, believing
that an entry for arrest presented an even greater intrusion and should be afforded at least
1981] 413
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The United States Supreme Court reversed the decision and held that
a warrantless arrest in a suspect's home, like a warrantless search, is un-
constitutional. 9 This closed the gap that had existed for so long between
the fourth amendment protection afforded to people and that afforded to
property. Mr. Justice Stevens, writing for the majority, stated: "In terms
that apply equally to seizures of property and to seizures of persons, the
Fourth Amendment has drawn a firm line at the entrance to the house.
Absent exigent circumstances, that threshold may not reasonably be
crossed without a warrant. '40 The key to the resolution of this issue is an
understanding that any difference in intrusiveness between an arrest and
a search is not one of kind but one of degree. In both instances there has
been a breach of privacy, namely the entrance into an individual's home.
Many aspects of individual privacy are protected by the fourth amend-
ment but "[l~n none is the zone of privacy more clearly defined than
when bounded by the unambiguous physical dimensions of an individ-
ual's home - a zone that finds its roots in clear and specific constitu-
tional terms: 'The right of the people to be secure in their . . . houses
. . . shall not be violated.' ",41
The New York Court of Appeals, in affirming Payton's and Riddick's
convictions, had based its decision on the Supreme Court's opinion in
Watson.4 That case held that the arrest of the defendant, in public and
without a warrant, did not violate the Constitution. s However, not only
are the grounds for the Watson decision inapplicable to Payton, but the
grounds themselves are questionable.
Watson was based on three premises. First, it was well-settled that
as great a protection. Id. at 324, 380 N.E.2d at 238, 408 N.Y.S.2d at 409. (Cooke, J.,
dissenting).
39. Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 576 (1980).
40. Id. at 590.
41. Id. at 589 (quoting the fourth amendment). Justice Stevens also noted several factors
that were not considered by the court in deciding the case. First, exigent circumstances were
arguably present in at least one of the arrests considered. See note 29 supra. Since the lower
courts considered these arrests routine, the Supreme Court treated them likewise. Second,
lack of consent was not an issue. Crowbars were used to break open Payton's door, see note
26 supra and accompanying text, and Riddick was seized before he could either object or
consent. See note 30 supra. The fact that this three-year-old son opened the door for the
police was held to be of no consequence. For a discussion of searches consented to by the
minor child of an adult defendant, see Annot., 99 A.L.R.3d 598 (1980). Lastly, in neither
arrest was it argued that police lacked probable cause to believe that the suspect was at
home when they entered. 445 U.S. at 583.
42. See note 35 supra.
43. 423 U.S. at 414-24.
414 [Vol. 15:407
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common law authorized the practice of warrantless arrests in public.44
Second, the clear consensus of the states was to approve warrantless ar-
rests.45 Third, there were congressional statutes authorizing the practice
and indicating that Congress believed the practice to be constitutional.46
However, where the warrantless arrest is made in the home, as it was in
both arrests considered in Payton, these grounds simply do not apply.
First, the issue of warrantless in-home arrests was not well settled at
common law. It remains debatable whether or not such arrests were au-
thorized.47 The common law, therefore, should not be as persuasive in
Payton as it was in Watson.'8 Secondly, there is no clear consensus of the
states on the issue of such arrests. Although a majority of states consider-
ing the issue allowed warrantless in-home arrests when Payton was de-
cided, there has been a marked decline over the past decade in states so
holding.49 Virtually all state courts recently deciding the issue have held
that, absent exigency, a warrantless in-home arrest is unconsitutional.50
Other than New York's decision in Payton, only Florida has recently
upheld such an arrest in spite of constitutional attack.5 1 Thirdly, there is
no corresponding statute authorizing warrantless arrests made in the
home.2
Even if these grounds were applicable to the Payton case, there could
not be a well-founded holding to the contrary of that reached by the
court in Payton. Congressional statutes, like state statutes, are open to
constitutional attack. Case precedent and common law have merely as-
sumed that a warrantless in-home arrest is reasonable and therefore do
not present a strong precedent. Moreover, state consensus does not, or
should not, create binding precedent for the constitutional interpretation.
The mere fact that "everybody is doing it" simply does not make the
practice ipso facto constitutional. Felonies at common law were much
more serious than today when, for instance, many white collar and vic-
tinless crimes are considered felonies. The point is that there is not the
urgency of the magnitude of an exigent circumstance, just because the
individual is a suspected felon. Of course, where there are true exigent
44. Id. at 421-23.
45. Id. at 419-21.
46. Id. at 415-16.
47. See note 8 supra and accompanying text.
48. This reasoning is also applicable in countering Justice White's dissent in Payton, 445
U.S. at 603-20.
49. 445 U.S. at 598-99.
50. Id.
51. State v. Perez, 277 So. 2d 778 (Fla. 1973), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1064 (1973).
52. 445 U.S. at 601 n.53.
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circumstances, these can excuse the need for a warrant.
The Court's decision in Payton is firmly entrenched in and fortified by
the fourth amendment. Although the Court has stated that "logic some-
times must defer to history and experience", 53 Payton does not subscribe
to the notion that logic must defer at all. After two hundred years,
searches and seizures of property and searches and seizures of persons are
brought together on more equal ground.54 There is no logical reason why
fewer safeguards should attach to a search and seizure of persons.
"[N]either antiquity nor legislative unanimity can be determinative of the
grave constitutional question presented [and] can never be a substitute
for reasoned analysis.
'55
In Coolidge v. New Hampshire" the Supreme Court recognized that:
the notion that the warrantless entry of a man's house in order to arrest
him on probable cause is per se legitimate is in fundamental conflict with
the basic principle of Fourth Amendment law that searches and seizures
inside a man's house without warrant are per se unreasonable in the ab-
sence of some one of a number of well defined "exigent circumstances. 57
Now, with Payton, this conflict is settled. Payton, however, left un-
resolved the question of whether police have authority to enter the prem-
ises of a third party in order to execute a valid arrest warrant.58 This
issue was precisely the one facing the United States Court of Appeals for
the Fourth Circuit in Wallace v. King09
C. Wallace v. King
The Wallace case involved the search of two Fairfax residences for a
Mrs. Swain, who was named in a valid arrest warrant.60 The residences
53. United States v. Watson, 423 U.S. at 429 (Powell, J., concurring).
54. As Justice Mosk of the California Supreme Court noted in a similar case, it would be
"incongruous to pay homage to the considerable body of law that has developed to protect
an individual's belongings from unreasonable search and seizure in his home, and at the
same time assert that identical considerations do not operate to safeguard the individual
himself in the same setting." People v. Ramey, 16 Cal. 3d 283, 275, 545 P.2d 1333, 1340, 127
Cal. Rptr. 629, 636 (1976).
55..People v. Payton, 45 N.Y.2d at 324, 380 N.E.2d at 238, 408 N.Y.S.2d at 409 (Cooke,
J., dissenting).
56. 403 U.S. 443 (1971) (dicta).
57. Id. at 477-78.
58. "Nor do these cases raise any question concerning the authority of the police, without
either a search or arrest warrant, to enter a third party's home to arrest a suspect." 445 U.S.
at 583.
59. 626 F.2d 1157 (4th Cir. 1980).
60. Id. at 1159. Mrs. Swain was being sought for refusing to obey a court order in a
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searched were not Mrs. Swain's but those of her parents, the Wallaces,
and her parents' friends, the Debiases. The suit was filed under 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983 "' by the Wallaces and the Debiases.
The search of the Wallace home took place on October 6, 1976. Fairfax
police had received a phone call from Mrs. Swain's estranged husband.
He informed them that Mrs. Swain was at her parents' home. Upon their
arrival at the Wallace home, Mr. Swain identified a car in the driveway as
belonging to his wife. At 8:30 p.m. two officers were admitted into the
Wallace home without incident. They announced that their purpose was
to arrest Mrs. Swain, pursuant to a warrant for her arrest, and that they
had received information indicating she was on the premises. When the
police were asked if they had a search warrant, they replied that the ar-
rest warrant gave them the authority to perform the search.62 The search
which ensued was brief and fruitless. Both officers conceded that there
was ample time to obtain a search warrant and that there were no exigent
circumstances necessitating Mrs. Swain's immediate arrest.63
The Debiase search occurred about a month later. Again Mr. Swain no-
tified the Fairfax police that his wife was present at the Debiase home. At
6:00 p.m. two officers arrived and were met at the door by Mrs. Debiase
whom they proceeded to question. Once inside, they requested permission
to search the house for Mrs. Swain. Mrs. Debiase objected and asked to
see a search warrant but was told such a warrant was not needed since
there was a valid warrant issued for Mrs. Swain's arrest." This search
also failed to reveal Mrs. Swain's whereabouts.
The suit for money damages and declaratory and injunctive relief was
filed by the owners of the two houses searched. Argument was heard in
domestic relations matter concerning the custody of her infant child.
61. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1974 & Supp. 1979) entitled "Civil Action for Deprivation of
Rights" provides:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage,
of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to be sub-
jected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof
to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution
and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or
other proper proceeding for redress.
62. 626 F.2d at 1159. Although Mrs. Swain had occasionally stayed at the Wallaces' home
during periods of marital discord, she had not lived with them for a number of years.
63. The parties dispute whether there was hostility displayed by the officers. Id. at 1160.
64. Id. The police made inquiries at the Debiase residence three days after the Wallace
search but made no search at that time. They also received information that Mr. Swain
might be using the police for purposes of harassment. Mr. Swain was warned that he would
be prosecuted if such a motive developed. Swain denied the allegation. Without further in-
quiry, the search of the Debiase home was ordered. Id.
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February of 1979 and re-argued in October, 1979. However, the actual
decision was withheld pending the decision in Payton, which was handed
down April 15, 1980.65 The Wallace decision followed on July 1, 1980,
holding for the plaintiffs as follows:
Although Payton held that an arrest warrant requires that a suspect "open
his doors to the officers of the law," that holding was specifically limited to
the "dwelling in which the suspect lives." 445 U.S. at 603. An arrest warrant
indicates only that there is probable cause to believe the suspect committed
a crime; it affords no basis to believe that the suspect is in a stranger's
house.66
The Fourth Circuit goes beyond Payton's requirement of an arrest war-
rant for the seizure of an individual in his own home by finding that a
search warrant, as well as an arrest warrant, is required in order to at-
tempt to arrest a suspect on the premises of a third party. This decision,
although novel, is also well supported by both logic and the Constitution.
Other circuit courts have passed on this same issue, but none have found
as much protection existent in the fourth amendment.
The weight of authority among the circuits seems to be that where
there is probable cause to believe that a suspect named in an arrest war-
rant is within a third party's dwelling, the police have authority to enter
and search for him.6 7 Those courts which have held the search for the
suspect invalid have usually done so because there was no reason to be-
lieve the suspect was within that dwelling.6 8 There is also authority which
seems to require exigent circumstances in addition to an arrest warrant
and probable cause to believe the suspect is within.69 However no other
65. Id. at 1159.
66. Id. at 1161 (emphasis added).
67. United States v. Gaultney, 606 F.2d 540 (5th Cir. 1979); United States v. Brown, 467
F.2d 419 (D.C. Cir. 1972); United States v. McKinney, 379 F.2d 259 (6th Cir. 1967).
68. See, e.g., Wanger v. Bonner, 621 F.2d 675 (5th Cir. 1980) where the police searched a
home listed incorrectly on the arrest warrant. The court held that where twenty to twenty-
five percent of the warrants received had improper addresses, the address listed on the war-
rant gave no probable cause to search that address when the occupant established that he
was not the person named on the warrant. In Vasquez v. Snow, 616 F.2d 217 (5th Cir. 1980),
the police had followed the suspect for some time and knew that he did not spend more
than one or two nights at any one house. The court held that the search of four houses in a
neighborhood was invalid when the information that the suspect was staying at one of the
houses was received two or three days before the search. Fisher v. Volz, 496 F.2d 333 (3d
Cir. 1974) held that even with exigent circumstances, police can not enter the dwelling of a
third party to serve an arrest warrant without a search warrant if there is no probable cause
to believe that the suspect is there at the time. The police in Fisher admitted they had no
indication that the suspect was present in the apartment being searched.
69. Virgin Islands v. Gereau, 502 F.2d 914 (3d Cir. 1974). The court stated that arrest
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federal case has yet held that a search warrant is a constitutional prereq-
uisite. It is this distinction that makes the Wallace decision unique.
The court in Wallace explains that the probable cause needed for an
arrest warrant and that needed for a search warrant are not the same.70
The necessary ingredient missing from the arrest warrant is the probable
cause to believe that the suspect is in the stranger's house.71, Not even a
tortured reading of the fourth amendment could validate a search where
there is no probable cause to believe the object of the search is contained
in the area to be searched.7 2 It has long been recognized that the burden
of determining probable cause cannot be borne by the police.73 The gene-
ral rule that a warrant is needed to enter a house to search is well estab-
lished.74 The Wallace decision merely brings more consistency to the
warrants are not to be used as search warrant substitutes. Even with a valid arrest warrant,
the premises of a third party cannot be entered in search of a suspect except "in exigent
circumstances where the police officers also have probable cause to believe that the suspects
may be within." Id. at 928.
70. 626 F.2d at 1161.
71. Fisher v. Volz, 496 F.2d at 341.
72. U.S. CONST. amend. IV. "The right of the people to be secure in their. . . houses...
against unreasonable searches. . . shall not be violated. .. ."
73. The Supreme Court in Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10 (1948) explains:
The point of the Fourth Amendment, which often is not grasped by zealous officers,
is not that it denies law enforcement the support of the usual inferences which rea-
sonable men draw from evidence. Its protection consists in requiring that those infer-
ences be drawn by a neutral and detached magistrate instead of being judged by the
officer engaged in the often competitive enterprise of ferreting out crime. Any as-
sumption that evidence sufficient to support a magistrate's disinterested determina-
tion to issue a search warrant will justify the officers in making a search without a
warrant would reduce the Amendment to a nullity and leave the people's homes se-
cure only in the discretion of police officers. Crime, even in the privacy of one's own
quarters, is, of course, of grave concern to society, and the law allows such crime to be
reached on proper showing. The right of officers to thrust themselves into a home is
also a grave concern, not only to the individual but to a society which chooses to
dwell in reasonable security and freedom from surveillance. When the right of privacy
must reasonably yield to the right of search is, as a rule, to be decided by a judicial
officer, not by a policeman or government enforcement agent.
Id. at 13-14 (footnotes omitted).
74. The following is an excerpt from the oral argument of Johnson v. Louisiana, 406 U.S.
356 (1972). The attorney for the state, after arguing that it was unreasonable to require the
police to obtain a warrant, was asked:
Mr. Justice Stewart: "Are you familiar with this Court's case of Warden v. Hayden?"
Mrs. Korns: "Yes, your honor, I am."
Mr. Justice Stewart- "Well, why do you think this Court spent so long in carving out
an exception if there was [sic] no general rule that you cannot enter a'house without
a warrant?"
Quoted in Y. KAmxsAR, W. LAFAvE, AND J. ISRAEL, MODERN CRIMINAL PROcEDuRE 311-12 n.1
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fourth amendment. It assures an individual of a magistrate's considera-
tion of the issue of probable cause before his home will be entered, re-
gardless of the object of the search. 5
This even-handed protection of an individual's privacy rights in a pri-
vate home is infinitely preferable to the practice of acknowledging those
rights only when the objective is property. "[F]rom the standpoint of the
victim of the search, the invasion of the privacy of his home is unaffected
by the object of the policeman's search." 6 Regardless of the uncertainty
of the common law, it is the "physical entry of the home [that] is the
chief evil against which the wording of the Fourth Amendment is directed
.... " The Wallace rule, stated simply, requires that some showing of
probable cause for believing the individual to be located within the third
party dwelling be brought before a magistrate.7 8 If the police have no
such evidence, they have no business disrupting the third party's privacy.
If they do have such evidence and there is ample time, there is no reason
not to get a warrant. The cry of police efficiency espoused by the dissent
in Wallace should be given no weight. A practice should never be ap-
proved as constitutional merely because it makes law enforcement easier.
Requiring a search warrant seems the least that could be done consider-
ing the privacy invasion and the relative innocence of the third party.7 9
There is the argument, suggested by the dissent in Wallace, that hav-
ing a magistrate determine probable cause does not protect the third
party.80 This argument presupposes that magistrates do nothing but
(4th ed. 1974). For a related discussion, see T. TAYLOR, Two STUDIES IN CONSTITUTIONAL
INTERPRETATION (1969). According to Taylor, an examination of the history of the fourth
amendment shows that the Supreme Court has "stood the fourth amendment on its head"
in order to find a warrant requirement. Id. at 46-47.
75. Of course, Payton did hold that only an arrest warrant was necessary for the search of
the suspect's own home. 445 U.S. at 602. This allows for search without judicial determina-
tion of his presence. This holding is not wholly unsatisfactory because of the fact that it is
the suspect's home, and perhaps it can then be said to be per se reasonable to infer his
presence. However, problems are foreseeable in determining whether or not the dwelling is
in fact the suspect's home. Naturally this is a factual determination which ultimately will be
determined by the jury. However, as is the case with exigent circumstances, it will initially
be the police who make this determination.
76. Lankford v. Gelston, 364 F.2d 197, 205 (4th Cir. 1966).
77. United States v. United States District Court, 407 U.S. 297, 313 (1972).
78. If exigent circumstances are present, a court reviewing the legitimacy of the entrance
at a later time will be required to make this factual determination. Obviously the very na-
ture of the exception prevents a preliminary determination of probable cause.
79. It may be, even if the suspect is, or has been, present, that the third party is unaware
of the arrest warrant or that the suspect is "wanted."
80. 626 F.2d at 1162 (Hall, J., dissenting). A similar position was taken by Justice White's
dissent in Payton. 445 U.S. 616-17. There it was argued that sufficient safeguards exist to
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"rubberstamp" all applications for warrants. Even though no system is
perfect and "rubberstamping" may occur in some instances, the sugges-
tion that frivolous requests for warrants are not screened is improbable.
Furthermore, even if the practice of "rubberstamping" were widespread,
the remedy should not be the rejection of the necessity for a neutral de-
termination. If magistrates are not performing their assigned functions,
something should be done to insure that they do. The need for protection
still exists, whether or not the present methods used for guaranteeing
protection are effective. If the present methods are not effective, the logi-
cal remedy is to fashion some that are.
mH. CONCLUSION
The search and seizure clause of the fourth amendment has been the
source of much confusion. Although the language of the amendment con-
cerning what is required in order to protect the individual is not clear,
one thing stands out: There is no constitutional basis for any difference in
the treatment of the searches and seizures of property and the searches
and seizures of persons. Nevertheless, for two hundred years there have
been separate requirements based on the classification of the police objec-
tive. The arguments in favor of this distinction run into an additional
difficulty when the search and seizure is to take place in the home. The
home is protected by the plain language of the fourth amendment.
The Supreme Court in Payton held that a warrant is required to arrest
an individual in his home. The Court has finally recognized that privacy
suffers an equally great intrusion when the police objective is the arrest of
a person living therein as when a search is conducted for property. Thus,
an equal amount of protection is owed. The standard measure of protec-
tion, also mentioned in the fourth amendment, is the warrant, the magis-
trate's neutral determination of the existence of probable cause. The pur-
pose is to insure that the intrusion does not occur unless and until it is
judicially determined to be reasonable.
The Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals took Payton one step further.
Wallace held that a search warrant is also required before a search for a
suspect may be conducted in a third party's home. An arrest warrant
alone is simply not enough because there has been no determination by a
magistrate that the suspect is present. If an arrest warrant were all that
was required, every home owner would be at the mercy of the police and
protect the individual's privacy interests without requiring a trip to the magistrate. This
reasoning ignores the need for a warrant in any case. It is difficult to comprehend such a
reading of the fourth amendment.
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there would be no way to prevent abuse before it occurred. The remedy
after-the-fact is less than satisfactory since tort actions against the police
usually produce inadequate results.
The answers to Payton and Wallace are found in the fourth amend-
ment itself. Common law, history and experience do little to serve justice
when they are wrong. It is infinitely better to correct injustice rather than
to continue a practice which is patently unreasonable, merely because it
has been the accepted practice for many years.
Robert B. Lloyd, Jr.
